인도와 포괄적핵실험금지조약

인도와 포괄적핵실험금지조약

   

버락 오바마 미국 대통령이 포괄적핵실험금지조약(CTBT)을 회복하기로 한 결정이 인도의 전략 및 과학 분야에서 인도의 선택에 대한 활발한 논쟁을 불러 일으키고 있다. 현재까지 도출된 결과 중 주목할만한 것은 1996년 만장일치로 반대했을 때와는 완전히 다른 상황을 보이고 있다는 것이다. 그 당시 인도의 입장은 CTBT에 가입할 경우 최소한의 핵 억지력 유지의 신뢰성과 핵군축을 실시해야 할 가능성이 있다는 것이었다.

핵 시대의 초반부터 인도의 입장은 핵실험 반대였다. 1954년 인도는 유엔 군축 위원회(U.N. Disarmament Commission)에 핵실험을 금지하고 핵분열성 물질 생산을 동결하자고 전 세계에 요청한 바 있다. 마찬가지로, 1979년과 1982년 특별 군축 회의(Special Sessions on Disarmament)에서 핵실험 금지를 위한 조치를 제안했으며, 1988년에는 모든 핵무기 제거(Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons)를 위한 라지브 간디 액션 플랜(Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan)을 선보이기도 했다. 이 제안들은 정해진 시한 내에 모든 핵무기를 제거하기 위한 비가역적인 단계로서 핵실험을 금지해야 한다는 생각을 기반으로 한 것이었다. 하지만 1993년 11월 핵실험 금지 결의안을 공동 지지한 이후, 군축회의에서 논의되고 있는 협상을 저지시키는 입장으로 선회했다. 사실상 인도의 입장은 일관성을 유지한 것이었는데, 그 이유는 군축 계획에 시한이 염기되지 않은 것이 결함이라고 생각했기 때문이다.

CTBT에 관한 인도의 또 다른 논쟁의 요점은 중국과 파키스탄 등 핵무기 프로그램을 보유한 국가에 인접한 인도가 비핵무기 보유국처럼 선택이 한정된 것은 남아시아 안보상황을 위험하게 만든다고 본 것이다. 인도가 조약에 서명할 경우 인도는 핵실험 실시권을 포기하지만, 아직 주요 핵보유 적국인 중국은 조약 하에서 핵무기를 보유할 수 있고 미임계 실험을 통해 핵무기를 개량할 수도 있다. 이런 불평등을 알리기 위해 인도는 1995년 9월 유엔 총회에 대표를 파견하여 "핵보유국들이 핵실험을 수행하지 않고도 핵무기를 개발하거나 개량할 수 있는 기술을 습득한 후에 CTBT를 지지하고 있다. CTBT 조약 하에서 새로운 핵탄두를 개발하거나 개량하는 것은 CTBT 정신에 위배된다"는 입장을 밝혔다. 이후 인도는 "모든 때와 상황에서 핵실험이 안전하게 중단되어야 하며 핵무기 없는 세상을 만들기 위해서 합의된 시간 냉에 조약이 구속력을 발휘해야 한다"고 요구했다.

특히 인도는 핵보유국이 정해진 시간 내에 군축 약속을 이행한다는 항목에서 CTBT의 부적절함을 느끼고 있다. 인도는 CTBT를 핵비확산조약(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT)에서 비롯된 고유의 불균형을 그대로 복사한 것으로 간주하고 있는 것이다. 현재 NPT에서 핵보유국의 군축의무는 약하게 적용되지만 비핵보유국의 핵무기 개발은 강력하게 금지되고 있다. 핵보유국이 정해진 시간 내에 핵무기를 제거하겠다는 약속의 미흡함에 따라, 인도는 44개국의 비준이 있어야 조약이 발효된다고 명기된 CTBT 제 14장 별첨 2에 반대하고 있는 것이다.

분명히 그 때와 달리 많은 상황이 바뀌었다. 인도는 1998년 핵실험을 통해 핵무기를 확장했으며, 2008년 미국-인도 원자력 협정 하에서 원자력공급국그룹(Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG)을 통해 핵비확산체계에 부분적으로 참여했고, CTBT를 다시 논의하고 있다. CTBT를 반대하고 핵실험의 정당성을 주장하는 국내의 주장이 여전히 남아 있다. 예를 들면, 미국과 중국이 조약을 비준할 경우에 인도도 비준해야 한다는 것과 원자력 거래의 사전 조건으로 인도의 핵실험 금지가 필요하다는 것이다. NSG 회원국들이 인도에 한정된 면제를 부여했지만, 인도가 핵실험 금지 선언을 CTBT 서명을 통한 법적 약속으로 전환해주기를 바라고 있다.

인도가 CTBT를 거부하는 이유로 불충분한 군축 약속이 많이 언급되고 있지만, 현재 그 주장은 많이 약해져 있다. 그것은 인도가 사실상 핵보유국이기 때문이다. 핵무기를 보유함으로써 CTBT를 바라보는 시각은 극적으로 변화했다. 비핵보유국에게 차별적인 조약이라는 입장을 더 이상 유지할 수 없는 것이다. 대신 인도는 다른 핵보유국처럼 CTBT가 전략적 무기 프로그램에 적용되지 않도록 해야 한다는 입장을 취하고 있다. 다시 말하면, 사실상 핵보유국인 인도가 1990년대 중반에 진행된 CTBT 협상에서 NPT가 인정하는 핵보유국과 동일한 생각을 하고 있는 것이다.

이러한 논쟁에도 불구하고, 현재 CTBT에 대한 인도의 강력한 반대를 지지를 위해서는 10년 이상 인도를 난처하게 만든 두 가지 문제를 해결해야 한다. 첫째, 인도가 추가 핵실험을 하지 않아도 될 만큼 충분한 억지력을 확보하고 있는가? 둘째, 인도가 핵실험 없이 기존 핵무기를 개량할 수 있는 능력을 확보하고 있는가? 인도가 공개적으로 최소한의 신뢰성 있는 억지력을 보유하고 있다고 말하고 있지만, 일부 분석가들은 파괴력 측면에서 충분하지 않은 것으로 보고 있다. 그들은 인도의 핵무기, 특히 수소폭탄(thermonuclear devices)의 경우 실험을 통한 개량이 필요하기 때문에 CTBT에 가입할 수 없다고 주장하고 있다. 동시에 재야 과학자와 전략 커뮤니티에서는 향후 핵무기 설계를 위해 핵실험이 필요하다고 주장하고 있다. 중국의 군사 현대화 또한 인도의 핵실험 금지에 방해가 되고 있다.

---

India and the CTBT: The debate in New Delhi

President Barack Obama's decision to revive the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has triggered a flurry of discussions in New Delhi, where individuals in the strategic and scientific communities are now vigorously debating India's options. One notable outcome of the debate so far is the realization that India's approach to the CTBT today will be radically different from its approach in 1996, when New Delhi was unanimously opposed to the treaty (and was not yet a de facto nuclear weapon state). This time around, India is divided over the feasibility of joining a test ban when the credibility of its minimum deterrent is still in question and when acceding to the CTBT might mean appearing to abandon its stance on a deadline-linked disarmament process.

 

From the very start of the nuclear age, India was a vociferous proponent of a nuclear test ban. To wit, in 1954, India initiated a global call at the U.N. Disarmament Commission for an end to nuclear testing and a freeze on fissile material production. Likewise, in 1978 and 1982 at the Special Sessions on Disarmament, India proposed measures for banning nuclear testing, and in 1988, it introduced the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. These proposals were shaped by the belief that banning nuclear testing would be an irreversible step toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. However, after co-sponsoring a resolution for a test ban treaty in November 1993, India reversed course and tried to block the treaty text that was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament. This stance was actually ideologically consistent, since India felt that the treaty was flawed because it wasn't linked to a time-bound disarmament plan.

 

Another crux of India's argument against the CTBT was the perilous security environment in South Asia, in which India had limited options as a non-nuclear weapon state to deal with the lurking challenges from China's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's nascent weapons program. By signing the CTBT, India would have foregone the right to test nuclear devices, yet its primary nuclear-armed adversary, China, would be able to retain its nuclear weapons under the treaty and could even upgrade them through subcritical experiments. Pointing to this disparity, an Indian representative toldthe U.N. General Assembly in September 1995: "[We note that] nuclear weapon states have agreed to a CTBT only after acquiring the know-how to develop and refine their arsenals without the need for tests. . . . Developing new warheads or refining existing ones after [the] CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies, would be . . . contrary to the spirit of [the] CTBT." Later, New Delhi demanded a "complete cessation of nuclear tests in all environments and for all time" and "a binding commitment . . . within an agreed time frame, toward the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world."

 

Specifically, New Delhi felt that the CTBT was inadequate in terms of securing disarmament commitments from the nuclear weapon states under declared deadlines. It saw this as a discriminatory replication of the imbalance inherent in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, in which nuclear weapon states are weakly obligated to disarm and non-nuclear weapon states are strongly obligated to remain non-nuclear. The lack of commitments by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their nuclear weapons under a declared time frame also compelled India to oppose Article XIV of the NPT, which stipulates the CTBT's entry into force after 44 "Annex 2" countries sign and ratify it.

 

Clearly, much has changed since then. India's 1998 nuclear tests, growing nuclear arsenal, and partial integration into the nonproliferation regime via the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver that was part of the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal--along with the Obama administration's moves to revive the treaty--have caused New Delhi to reconsider its approach to the CTBT. Although opposition to the treaty remains, several domestic justifications for a nuclear test ban have emerged. For example: In addition to the pressure likely to be placed on India to join the ban if the United States and China ratify the treaty, there is also apprehension in New Delhi that prospective supplier states will stipulate India's commitment to a test ban as a precondition for nuclear trade. Such concerns are underscored by the fact that many NSG members, while granting the India-specific waiver, wanted India to convert its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a legal pledge by signing the CTBT.

 

Many in India do continue to cite the lack of sufficient disarmament commitments as central to their opposition to the CTBT, but today this argument is weaker--especially because India is now a de facto nuclear weapon state. The shift from being a nuclear "have-not" to a nuclear "have" dramatically altered the Indian perspective on the CTBT. Consequently, it will no longer be tenable for India to hold on to the old argument of discrimination against have-nots. Instead, like other nuclear weapon states, India will have to ensure that the CTBT (and any other nonproliferation mechanism) will not impinge on its strategic weapons program. In other words, India's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state now places it in the same mode of thinking that the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states held during CTBT negotiations in the mid-1990s.

 

Test ban opponents in India defend this position by arguing that its strategic program needs to be safeguarded until a credible disarmament process begins. On a sublime note, some in India will contend that the CTBT remains improvident until the nuclear weapon states commit to a time-bound disarmament framework. Yet to get the ball rolling on eliminating nuclear weapons, India passes the responsibility to the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council (the five nuclear weapon states recognized under the NPT). India has few justifications for its disinclination to propose any initiatives for a phased, definitive disarmament process--although a reasonable rebuttal would be its June 1996 statementto the Conference on Disarmament: "Countries around us continue their weapon programs. . . . India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons."

 

Such arguments notwithstanding, the strongest hindrance to Indian support for the CTBT today revolves around two questions that have perplexed Indians over the past decade. First, does India really have a credible minimum deterrent that would allow it to continue to abstain from further tests? And second, is India's nuclear establishment capable of improving its existing arsenal without the aid of nuclear testing? Though the public is assured that a credible minimum deterrent does exist, some analysts passionately contend that India's purported deterrent has not yet matured to that point in terms of number or yield. India's arsenal, they argue, must be improved--especially its thermonuclear devices--via further testing, and hence, a global test ban cannot be joined. Similarly, an influential third party in the scientific and strategic communities assumes that full-scale nuclear testing will be needed for future weapon designs and argues for keeping the testing option open. That Chinese military modernization is in full swing empowers this faction to obstruct progress toward an Indian test-ban commitment.

 

During the debate in New Delhi over the U.S.-India nuclear deal, worries about India's freedom to conduct future nuclear tests and potential complications in nuclear commerce were prominent. To soothe these fears, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government assuredthe Indian Parliament that the nuclear deal wouldn't preclude India's ability to undertake nuclear tests. Singh reportedly also assureda group of disgruntled nuclear scientists that the strategic nuclear program was safe and promised to secure the wherewithal for its future augmentations.

 

Such promises have hampered the scope for positive political action in India on the CTBT; the government now will have a tough job convincing parliament of the prudence of signing the treaty. Even a mere political call to abdicate the right to future testing will happen only after the nuclear scientific establishment, as well as the national security establishment, certifies the credibility of the existing arsenal, and the former verifies that the nuclear complex is capable of subcritical testing and simulation-based improvisations. Getting the nuclear establishment's support for the CTBT, however, may not be difficult, considering that by endorsing the CTBT it is basically confirming its capability to refine the arsenal without full-scale nuclear testing and its confidence in the Indian minimum deterrent. Further, a forceful political push could neutralize the naysayers even within the establishment.

 

A greater political challenge could be how to justify stepping away from New Delhi's past history of disarmament advocacy, because India's accession to the CTBT in its present form could imply an abandonment of its disarmament ideals or even contradict its own disarmament activism at previous CTBT negotiations. As a result, it will be difficult for New Delhi to support the CTBT unless the treaty adopts structural changes with new, clear linkages to a time-bound disarmament process.

 

Any Indian decision ultimately will be influenced by the ratification process in the U.S. Congress. Many in India profoundly believe that some in the U.S. military and Republican Party might resist and stall the ratification process. The reported proposalto reinstate the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program is seen as an illustration of the U.S. military's mindset on nuclear weapons. There is a dominant feeling among New Delhi's strategic analysts that the U.S. military will use the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review to push for the modernization of its nuclear forces, an effort that could have implications for the CTBT ratification process.

 

However, if Congress manages to resist such pressures and ratifies the CTBT, it could trigger a domino effect among other non-signatories. India would then be left with few options but to truly reconsider its official stance regarding the CTBT.

Source : KISTI, thebulletin.org